In my philosophical work I seek to illuminate how the fact we are socially situated beings impacts the structures of our thought and action. I pursue three interrelated projects.
​
Firstly, the idea that the mind is socially situated is as plausible as it is widely accepted. However, what does it really mean to say that minds are socially situated? How do we have to conceptualize the nature of mental states in order to accommodate the fact that they are subject to social forces such as gender norms? If some motivational states don’t result from conscious deliberation but instead spring from unconscious social influences, how can we know them? Are we responsible for them? While my work in this area is founded on results from psychology and cognitive science, I use the tools of philosophy to contribute to our grasp of the conceptual and ethical aspects of the social mind.​
​
​​A second field of interest is the phenomenon of overthinking, It’s my goal to further our understanding of (pathological) overthinking, its functioning and potential avenues for treatment. As above, my philosophical work in this area stands in close dialogue with researchers in psychiatry and psychotherapy but asks also conceptual question about the nature of overthinking, what differentiates it from healthy thinking and why it seems so similar to—certain kinds of—philosophical reflection. I defend the view that overthinking becomes irrational at the exact point it stops to produce new knowledge.
I am interested in deepening our awareness of mental illness and neurodiversity in general and further our understanding to what extend we should think of those conditions as ‘socially constructed’.
​
Lastly, I research political disagreement. I’m exploring how in a polarized world as ours we can disagree with each other respectfully and live our political differences in a democratic framework. My work in this area centrally revolves around how democratic citizens can deal with those who they see as promoting anti-democratic values.
-
(forth.) Wittgenstein, Mouffe, and the Depth of Political Disagreement, Synthese