

Teaching Portfolio

TEACHING EVALUATIONS

At Cambridge I have taught approximately 40 undergraduate students primarily in philosophy of mind and epistemology. To 15 of those students, I have given ‘supervisions’—the one-on-one teaching method used in Cambridge. The remainder, I have taught in a first-year seminar and a third-year lecture, ranging from 10 to 25 attendants. Lectures at Cambridge are but one part of a module which also consists of supervisions and sometimes seminars. They are relatively short and do not involve marking. Specifically, I have taught the following modules:

1st Year Undergraduate

- Metaphysics, Fall 2022 (as Seminar Leader)
- Set Texts (Plato, Descartes, Mill), 2021-2022 (as Supervisor)

2nd Year Undergraduate

- Epistemology, 2023-2024 (as Supervisor)
- Philosophy of Economics, 2022-2023 (as Supervisor)


3rd Year Undergraduate


- Epistemology of Mind, Spring 2024 (as Lecturer)
- Philosophy of Mind, 2023-2024 (as Supervisor)
- Philosophy of Psychiatry, 2023-2024 (as final-year thesis Supervisor)
- Political Philosophy, 2024-2025 (as Supervisor)
- Wittgenstein and his Successors (Anscombe, Austin), 2022-2023 (as Supervisor)

Quantitative Feedback

Lecture on Epistemology of Mind

These evaluations were collected anonymously by the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge. The raw data can be accessed [here](#).






Supervisions and Seminars

Since the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge does not collect student evaluations for supervisions, I collected my own anonymous feedback. My procedure consisted in sending students a questionnaire after the academic year has ended. The raw data can be accessed [here](#).


How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "The instructor (Pablo) was competent and well prepared for our sessions"?

13 responses




How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "Our sessions were well structured"?

13 responses




How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "I felt encouraged to speak and state my own opinion during our sessions"?

13 responses




How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "The level and pace of the sessions was appropriate"?

13 responses



How strongly do you agree with the following statement: "The instructor was appropriately responsive to e-mails outside of the sessions"?

13 responses



Qualitative Feedback

The following are some anonymous comments that students made on my teaching evaluations. The raw data can be accessed [here](#).

Pablo is a very talented lecturer and philosopher. He's inspiring and encourages me as a non-philosophy student to challenge myself on a daily basis. (*Epistemology of Mind*)

Lecturer went at a good speed and covered a good amount of content. He was also very engaging and answered questions well. (*Epistemology of Mind*)

You are a fantastic lecturer, with a delivery style that is quite possibly the most enjoyable I have come across this year. Good luck ! (*Epistemology of Mind*)

This is a very well made course. Very clear presentation and very engaging ways turning this material into something that seems to matter personally. (*Epistemology of Mind*)

Maybe TOO good?? 🍌 (*Epistemology of Mind*)

I've genuinely thoroughly enjoyed these lectures, so clear and with so many links to the reading, tackles questions well and used examples I can understand. I've found it a great overview, I really think I understand the general picture and some of the nuance before I even do the readings myself! (*Epistemology of Mind*)

Thank you. The sessions were great and really helped me. I was extremely stressed out about everything going on so was relieved to have someone so understanding. (*Supervision*)

The supervisions were flexible in that I could raise anything I didn't understand/wanted to discuss and we could go through it. They gave me a better understanding of the significance of the essay questions I wrote on and how they fit into other areas of philosophy. Receiving comments on my essay prior to the supo so I had time to look over them was helpful. (*Supervision*)

The styles of the sessions as long thoughtful discussions was great. The depth and detail of the comments on the essay was good. The sessions were also not boring - something that makes the whole process better. These were the best supervisions I've had in cambridge so I don't really have anything to say about what could be improved. (*Supervision*)

They helped clarify where I was confused, I enjoyed debating my points and felt this helped me improve, they were really interesting (*Supervision*)

I enjoyed how engaged you were during the sessions, you were enthusiastic and always came across as knowledgeable and where we met points of confusion you would go away and re-read. You were also extremely willing to give feedback and have conversations over email between supervisions. (*Supervision*)

3 things I liked: 1) Showed a genuine interest in my ideas- was willing to go over on time just to discuss them, 2) was flexible for me when I was dealing with challenges- made changes to session times and was okay with things being handed in late 3) gave very helpful feedback - made sure to be critical and tell me when something doesn't work but not shutting it down before properly discussing, 4) just made me feel better about things when i was really struggling. - i don't have any negatives. Found the sessions so helpful. (*Supervision*)

Our supervisions are very interactive. I felt really engaged because you consistently asked me questions to prompt and guide my thinking. I learned a lot of interesting philosophical concepts and ideas. I felt like my ideas were heard and considered. It wasn't a one-sided, lecture style teaching, but much more of a give and take. (*Supervision*)

I found that in our supervisions you were always very interested in what point I was trying to make in my essay; after I'd clarified any misconceptions or unclear points, you then seemed to revise how you thought about the essay and looked at how you could understand it better. Partly because of the previous point, I found you to be a very engaged supervisor. This made it feel as though we were working through the problems together. (*Supervision*)

Things I liked: 1. Pablo is very encouraging when I talk about my opinions, even if they are not fully developed yet. 2. Pablo is well-prepared for the sessions. The comments on my outlines and essays are very detailed and sent to me before the sessions, and we go through the major points structurally during the sessions. 3. Pablo is very nice and passionate! (*Supervision*)

Liked: Structured feedback and learning, friendly atmosphere, opportunity to discuss opinions. Can be improved: more detailed reading list (eg with the title and other bibliographic details), more feedback on essay-writing skills, saying in advance which readings are the most important. (*Supervision*)

They were very interesting, engaging and thought provoking. Honestly, I can't think of anything that could've been improved. (*Supervision*)

Pablo was one of, if not my favourite supervisor during my time at Cambridge - I always looked forward to our invigorating discussions. We met 5 times for Political Philosophy Part II Cambridge focusing on Feminism and Migration. Our discussions were engaging, thought-provoking and enjoyable - the content being analysed with both granular focus and broader considerations for implications contemporarily. Much of what I wrote in my exam drew on these discussions in major ways. As a student with a specific learning disorder, I will also speak to his understanding and student-led approach that made me feel extremely comfortable. (*Supervision*)

Nothing else - just that the best supervisions I had in Cambridge over my 3 years were ours! (*Supervision*)

SAMPLE SYLLABI

What follows are outlines for four classes: the course on scepticism I am teaching at Cologne, an advanced class on current issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, an advanced seminar on the philosophy of psychiatry and a sketch for a class on theory of action.

Syllabus 1: Scepticism

The figure of the philosophical sceptic occupies a central place in philosophy—from antiquity to contemporary analytic epistemology. The sceptic asks us whether we can know anything. The problem of philosophical scepticism consists in how we ought to deal with the sceptic. Can we answer them? Can we refute their argument? If we can't, does this reveal something deep about human knowledge? Can we be sceptics and live without knowledge at all? Or can we just ignore the sceptic? This master-level course introduces the different sceptical arguments through seminal historical expositions before turning to the main strategies of answering the sceptic in current epistemology.

Examination

Since this seminar is the basic module 1 (BM1) for the Master of Arts: Knowledge and Society all students have to write a term paper of not more than 6'000 words. If you would like the paper under my supervision please contact me before the end of term, i.e., 6.2.26, to arrange a preliminary meeting.

Participation Requirements

There won't be any student presentations. Reading of the set texts is mandatory. A week in advance I will upload some questions intended to guide your reading and facilitate preparation (here: pablohubacherhaerle.ch/scepticism, the password is "certainty2025"). Moreover, everyone is required to send me—via email to pablo.hubacher@icloud.com—two different questions about something they didn't understand or want to discuss until Tuesday evening. In our session on Wednesday we will then discuss all of those questions.

Time and Place

The seminar takes place on Wednesdays from 14–15:30 in room 4.202.

SYLLABUS

1. 15.10.2025: *Welcome*

No primary reading.

Further reading:

- Comesaña, Juan & Peter Klein (2024), "Skepticism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), [URL](#)
- Hookway, Christopher (1990), *Scepticism*, London: Routledge
- DeRose, Keith (1999), "Introduction" in DeRose, Keith & Warfield, Ted A. (eds.) (1999). *Skepticism: Contemporary Readings*. New York: Oxford University Press.

BLOCK 1: HISTORICAL SCEPTICS

2. 22.10.2025: *Pyrrhonism*

Primary Reading:

- Sextus Empirics (2nd / 3rd Century), *Outlines of Scepticism* (ed and trans. Annas & Barnes 1994): Book 1 (pp. 1–64)
[If pressed for time read sections i-xiv until the fifth mode (§§1-125 / pp. 3-32,) and section xv (§§164-177 / pp. 40-43).]

Further reading:

- Diogenes Laertius (3rd Century), “Pyrrho” and “Timon” (*Lives of Philosophers* IX.61–161), in *Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Diogenes Laertius*, Katja Vogt (ed.), Mohr Siebeck: pp. Katja Vogt (ed.): pp. 16–51.
- Hookway, Christopher (1990), *Scepticism*, London: Routledge: Chs. 1 & 2.
- Olfert, Christina M. M. (2015), “Skeptical Investigation and its Perks,” in *Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Diogenes Laertius*, Katja Vogt (ed.), Mohr Siebeck: pp. 147–170.
- Burnyeat, Myles (2012 [1980]), “Can the sceptic live his scepticism?” In: *Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press: pp. 205–235.

3. 29.10.2025: *Al-Ghazali* #1

Primary Reading:

- Al-Ghazali (11th / 12th Century) , “The Rescuer From Error” in Khalidi, Muhmmad Ali (ed. & trans) (2005), *Mediaeval Islamic Philosophical Writings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. 59–98.
[Note that Khalidi’s translation of the title is somewhat idiosyncratic, the text is commonly known as “The Deliverance from Error”.]

Further Reading:

- Hadisi, Reza (forthcoming), “Ghazālī’s epistemology”, In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, *The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
[I highly recommend this short introduction to Ghazali’s argument.]
- Srinivasan, Amia (2019), “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 119 (2): pp. 127-156.
[I also highly recommend this Srinivasan paper, it’s my favourite contemporary paper period]

4. 05.11.2025: *Al-Ghazali* #2

Primary Reading:

- Hadisi, Reza (2021) “Ghazālī’s Transformative Answer to Scepticism”, *Theoria*, 88(1): pp. 109-142.
[This is a rich and suggestive reconstruction of al-Ghazali’s argument. It presupposes some knowledge of the internalism/externalism debate about the nature of justification. The references below provide that.]

Further Reading:

- Goldman, Alvin I. (1979), “What is Justified Belief?” In George Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology*. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1–25.
[classic defence of externalism]
- Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee (2001), “Internalism Defended.” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 38(1): pp. 1–18.
[classic defence of internalism]

- Stroud, Barry (2002), “Understanding Human Knowledge in General”, in his *Understanding Human Knowledge: Philosophical Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 99–121.

5. 12.11.2025: Descartes #1

Primary Reading:

- Descartes, Rene (2008 [1641]), *Meditations on First Philosophy*, (trans. M. Moriarty), Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp. 1–24 (Letter of Dedication, Preface to the Reader, Synopsis and First and Second Meditation).

Further Reading:

- Wilson, Catherine (2012), *Descartes's Meditations: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Chs. 1 & 2.
- Hatfield, Gary (2002), *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Descartes' Meditations*, London: Routledge: Ch. 2.
- Williams, Bernard (2005 [1978]), *Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry*, London: Taylor & Francis Group: Chs. 1 & 2, Appendix 1 & 2.
[the most difficult introduction to Descartes of the three, but the most rewarding as well]

6. 19.11.2025: Descartes #2

Primary Reading:

- Broughton Jane (2002), *Descartes' Method of Doubt*, Princeton: University Press.

Secondary Reading:

- Stroud, Barry (1984), *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press: Chs. 1–2.
- Nagel, Jennifer (2005), “Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God”, *Canadian Journal Of Philosophy*, 35(3): pp. 465–49

7. 26.11.2025: Moore

Primary Reading

- Moore, G.E. (1959 [1925]), “A Defence of Common Sense” in *Philosophical Papers*: pp. 32–59.

Further Reading:

- McDowell, John (1982), “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68: pp. 455–479.
- Pritchard, Duncan (2008), “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge*. New York: Oxford University Press: pp. 283–310.
- Pritchard, Duncan (2007), “How to be a Neo-Moorean”, in Goldberg, S. (ed.) *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University: pp. 68–99.
- Pryor, James (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, *Noûs* 34 (4): pp. 517–549.
- Wright, Crispin (2002), “(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65 (2): pp. 330–348.

8. 03.12.2025: Wittgenstein #1

Primary reading:

- Wittgenstein, L. (1969), *On Certainty*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, §§1–65

Further Reading:

- Moyal-Sharrock, D. & Pritchard, D. (2025), *Wittgenstein On Knowledge And Certainty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9. 10.12.2025: *Wittgenstein #2*

Primary reading:

- McGinn, Marie (2021), “Wittgenstein on Certainty”, in her *Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism: Essays on the Later Philosophy*: Anthem Press: pp. 1–18.

Further Reading:

- Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (2003), “Logic In Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism And The Impotence Of Scepticism”, *Philosophical Investigations* 26(2): pp. 125-48.
- Wright, Crispin (1985), “Facts and Certainty”, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 71: pp. 429-472.
- Wright, Crispin (2004), “Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?”, *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 78 (1): pp. 167–212.

10. 17.12.2025 *Wittgenstein #3 (Scepticism about Other Minds)*

Primary Reading:

- Heal, Jane (2003), “What are Psychological Concepts for?” In her *Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language*. Cambridge University Press: pp. 225-249.

Further Reading:

- Austin, J. L., (1979), “Other Minds”, in J. O. Urmson, & G. J. Warnock (eds.), *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press: pp. 76–116.
- McGinn, Marie (2021), “The Real Problem Of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty And Wittgenstein On Scepticism About Other Minds”, in her *Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism: Essays on the Later Philosophy*: Anthem Press: pp. 19–30.

[Xmas-break]

BLOCK 3: CONTEMPORARY REPLIES TO SCEPTICISM

11. 07.01.2026 *Neo-Pragmatism*

Primary Reading:

- Rinard Susanna (2022), “Pragmatic Skepticism”, *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*; 104(2): pp. 434–453.

Further Reading:

- Hookway, Christopher (2012), “Peirce and Scepticism”, in his *The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and pragmatism*, Oxford University Press: pp. 20–38.
- Hannon, Michael (2019), “Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible”, *Philosophical Issues*, 29 (1): pp. 143–158.

- Rinard, Suanna (2021), “Reasoning One’s Way Out Of Skepticism”, in McCain, K. & Poston, T. (eds.), *The Mysteries of Skepticism*, Brill: pp. 240–264.

12. 14.01.2026 Contextualism #1

Primary Reading:

- Lewis, David (1996), ‘Elusive knowledge’, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74 (4):549 – 567.

Further Reading:

- Dretske, Fred (2004), “Externalism and Modest Contextualism.” *Erkenntnis*, 61(2/3): pp. 173–86.
- Williamson, Timothy, (2005), “Knowledge and scepticism”. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith, *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press UK: pp.
- Marušić, Bersilav (2010), “Skepticism Between Excessiveness and Idleness”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 18: pp. 60-83.

13. 21.01.2026 Contextualism #2 (Kantian Scepticism)

Primary Reading:

- Langton, Rae (2008), “Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 82(1): pp. 129–136.

Further Reading:

- Conant, James (2012), “Two Varieties of Skepticism”, in Abel, G. & Conant J. (eds.), *Rethinking Epistemology* 2, De Gruyter: pp. 1–75.

14. 28.01.2026 Contextualism #3 (The Politics of Scepticism #1)

Primary Reading:

- Ichikawa, Jonathan (2020), “Contextual Injustice”, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, 30(1): pp.1–30.
- [See also this interview in German for *Die Zeit* with Ichikawa: <https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2024-04/jonathan-ichikawa-zweifel-klimawandel-impfen/komplettansicht>]

15. 04.02.2026 Contextualism #4 (The Politics of Scepticism #2)

Primary Reading:

- McKenna, Robin & Ranalli, Christopher (forthcoming), “Skepticism and Conservatism”, *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, [URL](#).
- Levy, Neil (2025), “The Politics of Skepticism”, *Inquiry*: pp. 1–6, [URL](#).

Syllabus 2: Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

The cognitive sciences (psychology, neuroscience, behavioural economics, etc.) have yielded a host of important results which have altered our understanding of the mind. This advanced course revolves around some open questions in cognitive science and their ramifications for philosophical issues. First, we will take a good look at the popular predictive processing paradigm. Are our brains prediction machines? We dive into the Bayesian foundations of predictive processing and discussing its scope and interpretation. Next, we turn to the recently revived debate about the language of thought. Is there a language of thought? Could there be one? We will consider contemporary proponents but also some long-standing critics of the hypothesis. One area the debate around the language of thought plays out is in the metaphysics of belief. If there is a language of thought, what does this entail for how we think about belief? Lastly, we will discuss the interpretation of two thriving areas in psychology: confabulation and implicit bias. Can we introspect our reasons or is the best we can do to offer *post hoc* rationalizations? Also, are we responsible for our biases? Even if we don't know that we have them? Ranging from the foundational to the applied, this course provides a thorough introduction to contemporary questions in the philosophy of cognitive science.

Requirements

- Participation, including a reading presentation
- A final paper of 8,000-10,000 words

Readings

Predictive Processing: Revolution or Hype?

- Howhy 2013: *The Predictive Mind*: Chs. 1, 2.
- Friston 2010: "The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?"
- Mandelbaum 2018: "Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system".
- Fabry 2018: "Betwixt and between: the enculturated predictive processing approach to cognition".
- Hohwy & Seth 2020: "Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness"
- Williams and Montagnese forthcoming: "The Social Turn in Delusions Research" ([link](#)).

Is there a Language of Thought?

- Rescorla 2023: "The Language of Thought Hypothesis" (SEP article, [link](#)).
- Fodor 1975: *The Language of Thought* [selected section].
- Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum and Porot 2023: "The Best Game in Town: The Re-Emergence of The Language-Of-Thought Hypothesis Across The Cognitive Sciences" [see also the comments by Madva; Pereplyotchik; Roskies and Allen; Chalmers]
- Wittgenstein 1953: *Philosophical Investigations*, §§ 256–262.
- Meredith Williams 1998; *Wittgenstein, Mind, and Meaning*, Ch. 1.

- Bennett and Hacker 2022 “The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience”

Metaphysics of Belief: Dispositionalism vs. Functionalism

- Kim 2010: *Philosophy of Mind*: Chs. 3, 5.
- Schwitzgebel 2002: “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief”
- Misak 2024 “Ryle’s Debt to Pragmatism and Margaret Macdonald”
- Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018: “Against Dispositionalism”
- Schwitzgebel 2021: “The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief”

What’s the correct Interpretation of Confabulation Research?

- Wilson 2002: *Strangers to Ourselves*: Preface, Chs. 1, 2.
- Chater 2018: *The Mind is Flat*, Int., Ch. 6.
- Lawlor 2003: “Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority”
- Carruthers 2009: “How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition”
- Mercier and Sperber 2011: “Why do Humans Reason?”
- Keeling 2018: “Confabulation and rational obligations for self-knowledge”

Implicit Bias

- Take two of the IAT tests at [Project Implicit](#).
- Banaji and Greenwald 2013: *Blindspot*: Preface, Chs. 5–6.
- Mandelbaum 2015: “Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias”
- Leslie 2017, “The original sin of cognition.”
- Munton 2021: “Prejudice as a Misattribution of Salience”
- Crane and Farkas 2023: “Beyond the Doxastic”
- Holyrod, Scaife, Stafford 2017: “Responsibility for Implicit Bias”

Syllabus 3: Philosophy of Psychiatry

Mental health has become a ubiquitous topic. Increased numbers of young and not-so young people are getting diagnosed with mental health conditions and have started to use the label 'neurodivergent' for themselves. While experienced as empowering from the inside, many onlookers are sceptical, seeing this increase in diagnoses and diagnostic categories as an inflated trend. In this upper-level class, we will study foundational and applied questions in the philosophy of psychiatry to find our way through the topic of mental health. We look at questions such as: Are mental illnesses brain disfunction? In which respects can mental illnesses be said to be socially constructed? If so, what follows from this for our understanding of them? How should we think about significant increases in psychiatric classifications? Which role does the concept of rationality play in our understanding of mental illness? Further issues about epistemic injustice, moral responsibility and the relationship between psychiatry as a science and psychiatry as therapy will also be discussed. Moving from foundational questions in the philosophy of psychiatry to applied issues surrounding specific psychopathologies, we will achieve a thorough introduction to this burgeoning field.

Requirements

- 50% end-of term paper between 6'000 and 8'000 words. Proposal to be discussed by the end of term.
- 30% (co-)leading a discussion on at least one of the topics discussed
- preparing a 10-minute introduction outlining the broader context of the topic under discussion (philosophical, psychiatric, psychological, etc.)
- preparation of questions and contribution to the discussion
- 20% class activity
- attendance in class is required (two absences are allowed)

Tentative Schedule

[asterisks indicate further reading]

1. Intro (11/10)

- *Murphy 2019: "Philosophy of Psychiatry" ([SEP](#))

2. Mental illness #1 (18/10)

- Szasz 1960: "The myth of mental illness"
- *Pickard 2009: "Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth"

3. Mental illness #2 (25/10)

- Wakefield 1992: "The concept of mental disorder. On the boundary between biological facts and social values"
- *Garson 2022: *Madness* [selected sections]

4. Social Construction (08/11)

- Hacking 1995: “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds”
- *Hacking 1999: *The Social Construction of What?* Chs. 1, 4.

5. *Schizophrenia* (15/11)

- Sass & Parnas 2003. “Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self”.
- *Sass 1995: *The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind* [selected sections]

6. *Delusions* (22/11)

- Bayne & Pacherie 2005: “In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.”
- *Bortolotti 2022 “Delusion” ([SEP](#)).

7. *Depression* (29/11)

- Ratnayake 2021: “It’s Been Utility All Along: An Alternate Understanding of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and The Depressive Realism Hypothesis”
- *Whiteley: forthcoming. “Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness”

8. *Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder* (06/12)

- Hubacher Haerle 2023: “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”
- *Szalai 2016: “Agency and Mental States in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder”

9. *Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder* (13/12)

- Koi 2020: “Born which Way? ADHD, Situational Self-Control, and Responsibility”
- *Champ et al. 2023: “Seeking Connection, Autonomy, and Emotional Feedback: A Self-Determination Theory of Self-Regulation in Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder”

10. *Addiction* (20/12)

- Pickard 2020: “Addiction and the self”
- *Holton 2016: “Addiction, Self-signalling, and the Deep Self”

11. *Psychotherapy* (10/01)

- Lacewing 2014: “Psychodynamic psychotherapy, insight, and therapeutic action.”
- Grodniewicz 2024: “Belief revision in psychotherapy”
- *Forrester 2023: *Freud and Psychoanalysis* [selected sections]

12. *Epistemic injustice in psychiatry* (17/01)

- Sanati & Kyratsous 2015: “Epistemic injustice in assessment of delusions”
- *Hofman, Hubacher Haerle & Maatz 2023: “What is the Meaning of Delusional Utterances?”

Syllabus 4: Theory of Action

The theory of action is a sub-discipline of the philosophy of mind experiencing somewhat of a revival lately. It connects theoretical with practical philosophy. Central questions of the theory of action include: What are intentional actions? What distinguishes them from brute behaviour and mere happenings? Can animals act intentionally? What are the reasons for which we act? Are explanations of actions causal or do they constitute a *sui generis* form of explanation (e.g. teleological, intentional)? Also, we look at topical issues such as responsibility for unconscious motives and the politics of desire. In this upper-level course we tackle these problems from a substantive perspective, based on paradigmatic contributions to the contemporary debates ranging from Elizabeth Anscombe to Amia Srinivasan.

What is Intention?

- Anscombe 1957: *Intention*, §1.
- Setiya 2018: “Intention” (SEP, [link](#))
- Bratman 1987: “Two Faces of Intention”
- Holton 2009: *Willing, Wanting, Waiting*: Ch. 1.
- Velleman 2007: “What Good is a Will?”
- Paul and Morton 2019: “Grit”

Causalism

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